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COOPERATION, COMMANDEERING, OR CROWDING OUT?: 
FEDERAL INTERVENTION AND STATE CHOICES IN 
HEALTH CARE POLICY 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)1 will 
dramatically reshape federal-state relations in health care policy.2  Both state 
and federal governments play a role in the regulation of health insurance and 
the provision of health care programs.  The ACA substantially alters these 
roles, extending and deepening federal regulation of health insurance, creating 
new health care “exchanges,” expanding federally subsidized medical care 
programs (such as Medicaid), and increasing pressure on state governments to 
follow the federal government’s lead.  As two commentators noted, this law 
“marks the beginning of a new chapter in the centuries-long debate about the 
appropriate balance between the states and the federal government in the 
development, administration, and enforcement of domestic policy in the United 
 
  *   Professor of Law, Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law.  This paper is based on a presentation at the Kansas Journal 
of Law & Public Policy Symposium, “The Role of States in Federal Health Care Reform,” 
February 11, 2011.  Portions of this paper draw heavily upon prior research on federalism in 
environmental law.  Please see Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal 
Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2007), Jonathan H. 
Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005), 
and Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005).   Thanks to Daniel Smith for his research assistance.  Any errors, 
omissions, or inanities are the fault of the author. 
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.). 
2. At the time of this writing there is substantial uncertainty as to how and even whether all 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) will be implemented.  Several court 
challenges are pending and the Republican majority in the House of Representatives has pledged 
to block funding necessary to implement aspects of the law.  See Edward Eynon & Leslie 
Levinson, Healthcare News from Capitol Hill and the Department of Health and Human 
Services, INSUREREINSURE.COM (Feb. 22, 2011, 9:10 AM), 
http://www.insurereinsure.com/?entry=3215. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791834
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States.”3  Others go even further, suggesting the ACA “radically alter[s] the 
relationships between individuals and the government as well as the national 
government and the states,”4 or it constitutes a “health care revolution” more 
dramatic than the adoption of Medicare in 1965.5 
Most legal discussion and litigation over the ACA to date has focused on 
the “individual mandate,” a requirement that all Americans obtain and 
maintain health insurance that meets federally prescribed minimum standards.6  
Twenty-eight states and numerous private organizations have filed suit alleging 
that the individual mandate exceeds the federal government’s limited and 
enumerated powers.7  Among other things, those challenging the mandate 
argue that requiring all Americans to purchase a privately-offered good or 
service is unprecedented and improper.8  Unless the mandate is repealed, most 
observers expect the question to reach, and ultimately be resolved by, the U.S. 
Supreme Court.9 
Whether the individual mandate is consistent with the text and structure of 
the Constitution is only one of the federalism-related questions raised by the 
ACA.  Other provisions of the law could test other constitutional limits on 
federal power, particularly if the law is implemented without due regard for 
state interests and relevant constitutional constraints.  Insofar as the law 
restructures federal and state roles and responsibilities in health care policy, the 
 
3. Christopher C. Jennings & Katherine J. Hayes, Health Insurance Reform and the 
Tensions of Federalism, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2244, 2244 (2010). 
4. Robert E. Moffit, Revitalizing Federalism: The High Road Back to Health Care 
Independence, HERITAGE FOUND., BACKGROUNDER No. 2432, (June 30, 2010), http://www 
.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/revitalizing-federalism-the-high-road-back-to-health-care-
independence. 
5. Richard A. Epstein, Bleak Prospects: How Health Care Reform Has Failed in the United 
States, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 2–3 (2010). 
6. § 1501(a), 124 Stat. at 242–44; I.R.C. § 5000A (2006).  The law contains a few minor 
exemptions for, among other things, religious reasons.  See § 5000A(d)(2)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 
246 (creating a religious exemption). 
7. See Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Florida ex 
rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. Of Health And Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 
285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Heath and Human Servs., 
No. 1:10-CV-762, 2011 WL 223010 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10 CV 
1065, 2010 WL 4947043 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2010); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Servs., 716 F.Supp.2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033 DMS, 2010 
WL 3418436 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010). 
8. See Randy Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 587 (2011) (concluding the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional and unprecedented).  Contra Mark Hall, Commerce Clause 
Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2011) (concluding 
the individual mandate is constitutional and supported by precedent). 
9. See, e.g., Michael Kirkland, U.S. Supreme Court: Challenges Could Burst Healthcare 
Triumph, UPI.COM (March 22, 2010, 2:51 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/03/22/ 
US-Supreme-Court-Challenges-could-burst-healthcare-triumph/UPI-53811269283884 
(discussing looming legal challenges expected to make their way to the Supreme Court). 
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ACA should prompt reconsideration of how the respective levels of 
government act and interact within this policy area.  Many details respecting 
implementation of the ACA have yet to be determined.  Decisions made by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), as well as other federal 
agencies,10 will define the contours of the new federal and state relationship in 
health care policy for years, if not decades, to come.  Due consideration of how 
different implementation choices affect federal-state interactions can ensure 
that the law is implemented in an effective and desirable way.  Failure to 
consider such factors could precipitate further litigation and frustrate the 
ACA’s objectives. 
This Article’s analysis proceeds in three parts.  Part II of this article 
outlines the policy considerations in determining the proper federal and state 
balance in health care policy.  There are strong arguments for state primacy in 
health care policy, but also substantial justifications for federal intervention.  
Part III discusses the concept of “cooperative federalism,” under which the 
federal government encourages state governments to implement policies in 
accord with federal priorities, and identifies constitutional limitations on the 
federal government’s ability to direct or even influence state policy choices. 
Even if the constitutional challenges to the individual mandate fails, 
federalism-based challenges to implementation of the ACA could succeed. 
Additionally, there are practical limitations on the federal government’s 
ability to influence state policy choices.  Part IV discusses how federal policy 
decisions can influence state policy choices, and not always in the way federal 
policymakers intend.  Federal actions can have both direct and indirect effects 
on state regulatory choices.  These effects may be either positive or negative, 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  The potential of both positive and 
negative effects weakens the common presumption that adopting a federal 
“floor”a minimum federal standard below which no state may operatewill 
increase social welfare.  The adoption of policies designed to raise the “floor” 
across states may also discourage state-level innovation and create the practical 
effect of lowering the “ceiling” as well.  Considering these potential effects can 
reduce the unintended consequences of federal action and intervention in 
health care policy. 
II.  JURISDICTIONAL CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE 
The U.S. Constitution establishes a system of “dual sovereignty,” under 
which both the federal and state governments are “sovereign.”11  The 
Constitution delegates to the federal government a set of limited and 
enumerated powers, while state governments retain a plenary police power that 
empowers them to protect public health, safety, welfare, and morals.12  This 
 
10. See generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS 
PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) (2010) 
(detailing rulemakings required by the ACA). 
11. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
12. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (“[T]he structure and 
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federalist structure supports a general, albeit rebuttable, presumption that any 
given policy question should be addressed by state governments.13  Before the 
federal government can act, it must demonstrate that a given policy is within 
the scope of its enumerated powers.14  With few exceptions, where the federal 
government does not act, things will remain in state hands.15 
The presumption for decentralization can be overcome, but should not be 
cast aside lightly, as there are several potential benefits to decentralized policy-
making.  Among other things, decentralization of policy decisions will increase 
preference satisfaction, help overcome the “knowledge problem” that vexes 
centralized-decision-making, enhance political accountability, and could foster 
innovation. 
In a decentralized system, there is likely to be a greater “fit” between a 
given jurisdiction’s policies and the preferences of local residents.16  Health 
policy often implicates subjective value preferences that may vary across the 
nation, including preferences for greater or lesser degrees of economic 
redistribution or risk avoidance.  Some jurisdictions may be more comfortable 
than others with policy measures that restrict consumer choice, restrain 
industry competition, or allow individuals to take certain types of economic or 
health-related risks.  As a result, there is not always a single “right” answer to a 
given health policy question, such as the minimum amount of coverage an 
insurer should be allowed to provide or the degree to which insurance 
companies should be allowed to account for various risk factors in the pricing 
of insurance products.  Different rules impose different trade-offs among 
competing values and interests for which there is no single “right” answer. 
Given varied preferences, a decentralized system will result in greater net 
satisfaction of individual policy preferences than will a uniform federal 
system.17  To illustrate, consider a hypothetical nation consisting of two states, 
K and M, each of which has 100 residents.18  Assume that seventy percent of 
 
limitations of federalism . . . allow the States ‘great latitude under their police powers to legislate 
as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.’” (quoting 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996))). 
13. Portions of this discussion are adapted from Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch 
in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 133–57 (2005). 
14. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature 
are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, for forgotten, the constitution 
is written.”). 
15. For further discussion of the application of constitutional federalism principles to 
environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005).  For a somewhat different perspective 
on this question, see Robert V. Percival, “Greening” the Constitution - Harmonizing 
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809 (2002). 
16. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493–94 (1987) (discussing how a decentralized government can be more 
responsive to diverse local interests and preferences). 
17. See id. at 1494. 
18. This illustration is adapted from a hypothetical that discusses satisfaction with 
legislation outlawing smoking in public buildings.  See id. 
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the people in State K support a mandate that health care insurance cover 
mental health services equally with traditional health care services, while only 
forty percent of people in State M share this preference for mental health 
parity.  The remaining people in each state oppose the proposed mandate.  If a 
decision on mental health parity is made at the national level, based upon 
popular preferences, it will pass, and 110 people will live in a jurisdiction in 
which the policy matches their preferences.  If, however, each state is free to 
adopt its preferred policy, mental health parity will be adopted in State K, but 
not in State M.  The result now is that 130 people will live in a jurisdiction in 
which the relevant policy matches their preferences.  If citizens of each state 
are mobile, and exit remains an option, the percentage of people who live in a 
jurisdiction with policies that match their preferences could be higher still.  
This is obviously a stylized example, but it illustrates the point that a 
decentralized system will result in greater preference satisfaction than the 
centralized, uniform alternative. 
The failure to take into account local conditions, tastes, preferences, and 
economic conditions, can lead to “one size fits all” policies that fit few areas 
well.19  There are tremendous socio-economic, demographic, and other 
differences across states that can influence what mix of policies are optimal for 
a given jurisdiction.  The ideal policy for a jurisdiction with an older average 
population may not be the same as for an area with a younger population or in 
which there are more children.  Factors ranging from population density and 
climate to socio-economic differences and cultural norms can influence what 
set of policies or institutions will maximize welfare.  Matching policies with 
local preferences and conditions often requires local knowledge and expertise 
that is unavailable at the federal level.  A more decentralized system is better 
able to overcome this “knowledge problem,”20 and ensure that regulatory 
measures take account of local conditions and preferences.21 
Decentralization can also enhance accountability.  Local officials may be 
more in touch with and responsive to the concerns of their constituents.  If 
 
19. See KAROL CEPLO & BRUCE YANDLE, Western States and Environmental Federalism: 
An Examination of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 225, 225–26 (Terry 
L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (“There is recognition that homogenous solutions applied 
to heterogeneous problems often yield high costs and weak results.”).  While, as a theoretical 
matter, federal regulation could take into account regional variation, “federal regulation generally 
imposes uniform requirements throughout the country” and, where variable standards exist, it is 
not due to regional environmental differences.  Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and 
Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 537 (1997). 
20. See generally Friedrich. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 519–20 (1945) (detailing the economic problem resulting from the fact that “the 
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or 
integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”). 
21. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 180 (1999) (“By decentralizing environmental decision-
making, we may be able to obtain improved responsiveness to changing circumstances and new 
information.”). 
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nothing else, a lower ratio between policymakers and those subject to policy 
decisions may reduce agency costs, facilitate monitoring, and strengthen 
communication between policymakers and the public at large.  As Marci 
Hamilton observes, “[t]he smaller the polity in geography and in population, 
the easier it is for the people (1) to monitor what their government is doing, (2) 
to criticize or praise, and therefore (3) to affect public policy.”22  Decentralized 
systems are also less prone to rent-seeking.23 
Decentralization, and the resulting policy experimentation and inter-
jurisdictional competition, can encourage policy innovation as policymakers 
seek to meet the economic and other demands of their constituents.24  As a 
result of such competition, states are able to learn from each other’s successes 
and failures.25  In this way, states are able to act as “laboratories”26 developing 
new and improved ways of addressing health policy concerns.27  The federal 
government also benefits from state-level experimentation and innovation 
because local initiatives can provide federal policymakers with evidence of 
how certain types of policies will affect health outcomes.  Most observers 
credit state-level experimentation in the provision of federally funded welfare 
programs with providing the basis for federal welfare reforms enacted in the 
1990s.28  Such experimentation has also been important in environmental 
policy.29  Prior to the enactment of the ACA, state-level experimentation was 
alive and well in health care policy, as illustrated by recent health care reforms 
 
22. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 321 (2003); see also 
HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 7 (1996) (“[A]llocation to local governments of regulatory authority over local 
externalities allows decisions to be made by the representatives of the citizens who benefit the 
most and pay the most for higher environmental quality.”). 
23. Rent seeking is “the attempt to obtain economic rents . . . through government 
intervention in the market.”  Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 
(1986).  In the regulatory context, rent-seeking typically consists of pursuing those government 
interventions that will provide comparative advantage to a particular industry or subsector.  See 
Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism 
and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1995) (discussing federalism as a 
constraint on rent-seeking). 
24. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418 (1956) (discussing the impact of constituents on the policymaking process). 
25. PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 240 (2004) (“[Even when state experiments 
fail] they provide important information for other states and for national policy.”). 
26. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”). 
27. See id.; David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 97–104 (2005). 
28. See Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur 
Environmental Innovation, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE 
AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 272 (Jim Chen ed., 2003). 
29. See id. at 266–67. 
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adopted in states like Massachusetts and Indiana.30 
While there may be a strong case for decentralization—perhaps even 
justifying a general presumption in favor of decentralization—that 
presumption can be overcome in any specific context by demonstrating the 
potential benefits of federal intervention in a specific instance.  In some cases, 
there may be economies of scale that favor federal intervention.  The federal 
government may enjoy a comparative advantage in certain matters that rely 
upon technical expertise.  It may also be more efficient to maintain national 
markets with national regulatory standards than to risk the balkanization of 
such markets through the adoption of variable state standards.  Federal 
intervention may also be justified insofar as there is a preference for using 
health policy to redistribute wealth or to ensure a national “floor” that no 
jurisdiction may drop below. 
There are definite economies of scale in some types of economic and 
medical research that can inform the development of health care policy and 
insurance regulation at all levels of government.  While much of the 
information required for the development of efficient health care policies may 
be local in nature, information about the cost-effectiveness of given types of 
health interventions or the likely market effects of certain types of policies are 
likely to apply across jurisdictions.  Cancer cells do not care whether they are 
in Russell, Kansas or La Russell, Missouri. Scientific or technical expertise 
will have public good characteristics, and it would be inefficient to force each 
jurisdiction to engage in duplicative research.31  In addition, there are likely to 
be scale economies in the resources and technical expertise required for some 
forms of health-related research.  Centralized data collection and analysis may 
be more efficient if done at the federal level.  It may also make sense for the 
federal government to provide “expertise” on the technical aspects of 
regulation,32 investigating such matters as regulatory design and 
implementation.33  Duplicating this sort of research at the state level would 
serve little purpose and divert resources from other policy priorities. 
While it would not make sense to force each jurisdiction to develop 
technical expertise that could be provided at the federal level, it is important 
 
30. See, e.g., THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, STATES 
MOVING TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE REFORM, http://www.kff.org/uninsured/ 
upload/State-Health-Reform1.pdf (last updated July 10, 2009); Sam Wainwright, In the States: 
Indiana’s Health Care Equation, THE NEW HEALTH DIALOGUE, (Jun. 18, 2010), 
http://health.newamerica.net/blogposts/2010/in_the_states_governor_daniels_health_care_equatio
n-33224. 
31. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 
614–15 (1996) (“Absent centralized functions, independent state regulators will either duplicate 
each other’s analytic work or engage in time-consuming and complex negotiations to establish an 
efficient division of technical labor.”). 
32. WALLACE E. OATES, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, A RECONSIDERATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 1, 22 (November 2001), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/ 
10460/1/dp010054.pdf. 
33. See Esty, supra note 31, at 615–16 (“[T]he smaller the regulating entity, the more likely 
it is to suffer from the absence of scientific scale economies.”). 
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not to conflate the argument for federally supported and conducted research 
and analysis, on the one hand, and federal policy making, on the other.  Unless 
one assumes that all states and localities should adopt the same health policy 
measures irrespective of their local preferences and conditions, the case for 
federal expertise does not, by itself, establish the case for federal policy-
making. The cancer cell may not care, but cancer rates could well vary across 
jurisdictions for a variety of reasons, as could voter preferences for how certain 
types of cancer risks should be addressed or how cancer treatment should be 
conducted or funded. 
There may also be economies of scale in making some regulatory 
decisions at a national level insofar as a single national standard is more 
efficient than a multiplicity of state standards.  Specifically, a single set of 
regulations may make more sense for a single, integrated national economy.34  
In the case of health insurance, for example, a single, integrated national 
market may be more efficient, and more competitive, than individual state 
markets, particularly when compared to smaller states.  A single, uniform set 
of regulatory requirements could enable firms to offer standardized products 
throughout the nation.  It may be more efficient for a drug or medical device 
maker to manufacture uniform products for a single national market than to 
adopt and implement different product or package designs for different states.  
Consumers may also benefit from national standards because lower 
compliance costs result in lower consumer prices.  In contrast, allowing states 
to adopt more stringent standards for insurance products poses the risk of 
balkanizing the national market and cost externalization. These costs must be 
balanced against the benefits of allowing local regulators to adopt policies that 
reflect local preferences and conditions. 
Not all favor the variability and competitive pressures generated by a 
decentralized system.  The flexibility of states to implement programs in line 
with local preferences can allow for innovation, but it can also permit states to 
deviate from desired outcomes and drop below a minimum level.35  If a given 
policy “floor” is considered necessary for normative or other reasons, this 
provides a reason for more centralized policy control.  Similarly, competitive 
decentralized systems can make economic redistribution more costly, this 
could be a reason to favor greater policymaking centralization.  Some 
jurisdictions are inevitably poorer than others, and centralized control can 
provide a means of redistributing wealth and associated capabilities from 
 
34. See, e.g., PIETRO S. NIVOLA & JON A. SHIELDS, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR 
REGULATORY STUDIES, MANAGING GREEN MANDATES: LOCAL RIGORS OF U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 17 (2001) (“Business interests, not without justification, often 
prefer nationwide regulatory standards to a hodgepodge of local rules: broad scope and 
standardization may lower uncertainty and increase efficiency.”). 
35. See Jennings & Hayes, supra note 3, at 2244 (“The flexibility that allows states and 
local governments to move quickly to address varying needs, to innovate, and to set 
geographically sensitive priorities locally also permits the creation of tremendous disparities in 
the availability of high-quality, affordable health care.”). 
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jurisdictions that “have” to jurisdictions that “have not.”36  Ensuring minimum 
funding levels for health care services across the nation may well require 
federal intervention. 
A rebuttable presumption in favor of leaving health care policy choices in 
state hands does not ensure the adoption of optimal health care policies.  It 
does, however, lessen the likelihood of federal overreach and preserves a 
greater realm for state-level experimentation and innovation.  While some 
states will inevitably make mistakes, so will the federal government.  This does 
not mean the federal government should never intervene—quite to the 
contrary.  It does, however, suggest the virtues of a system in which federal 
intervention is reserved are for those instances when it is most likely to 
improve the situation. 
III.  COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
The federal government has ample power to regulate health care and 
health insurance markets, as well as provide health care services directly.  
Under existing doctrine, the federal power to “regulate commerce . . . among 
the several states”37 can be used to regulate health insurers, medical service 
providers, drug manufacturers, and other companies involved in health care 
related services.  The federal spending power can be used to fund social 
welfare programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, which provide health care 
benefits to populations in need of care.38 
 The choice between federal and state action is not simply binary, and 
the respective powers of the federal and state governments are not entirely 
exclusive.  There is a great degree of overlap, particularly in the economic 
sphere.  Through its commerce power, the federal government may reach much 
economic activity, even if it is also subject to regulation by state governments.  
In these areas, the federal and state governments may act separately or 
together. 
Health care is among those areas of state and federal overlap.  While 
states remain the primary regulators of medical practice and have, for some 
time, had primary authority over the regulation of insurance, the federal 
government may regulate insurance under the Commerce Clause.  As Justice 
Black explained in 1944, “No commercial enterprise of any kind which 
conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the 
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make 
 
36. Senator Max Baucus, for instance, justified enactment of the ACA because, among 
other things, it would address the “maldistribution of income in America.”  See Byron York, 
ObamaCare Was Mainly Aimed at Redistributing Wealth, WASH. EXAMINER, (Apr. 2, 2010, 3:00 
AM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/obamacare-was-mainly-aimed-redistributing-
wealth. 
37. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
38. The permissibility of using the spending power in this fashion was established in 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), in which the Supreme Court upheld 
unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935. 
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an exception of the business of insurance.”39  The Supreme Court further 
explained in Gonzales v. Oregon, “Even though regulation of health and safety 
is ‘primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern,’ . . . there is no 
question that the Federal Government can set uniform national standards in 
these areas.”40 
Although the federal government has the power to intervene directly in 
health care markets, as either a regulator, funder, or direct provider, the federal 
government may also use its powers to encourage or discourage state efforts in 
this field.  The most direct way for the federal government to influence state-
level policy decisions is to dictate state policies from Washington, D.C.  Yet, 
such “commandeering” is off the table.  Rather, the federal government must 
use other means to encourage state action.  The federal government may 
regulate insurance companies directly, it may preempt states from regulating, 
and it may even authorize state regulations that, in the absence of federal 
legislation, might run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  The federal 
government may not, however, require states to regulate on its behalf. 41  As 
the Supreme Court explained in New York v. United States: 
 
The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state 
regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal 
Government to hold out incentives to the States as a means of 
encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes.  It does 
not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the States . . . .42 
 
State governments remain “sovereign” under the doctrine of “dual 
sovereignty,”43 and therefore cannot be commandeered by the federal 
government.  Whether to ensure sufficient disposal capacity for low-level 
radioactive waste44 or remedy lead contamination in drinking water,45 the 
federal government cannot require state governments to adopt desired policy 
measures.  Articulated by the Supreme Court in clear and unequivocal terms, 
this anti-commandeering principle admits no exceptions.46 
 
39. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944), superseded by 
statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 
(2006)). 
40. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271 (2006) (citation omitted). 
41. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a 
federal law requiring state officers to perform background checks on handgun purchasers); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a federal law requiring 
states to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to instructions of Congress). 
42. New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
43. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
44. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that portions of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act Amendments unconstitutionally commandeer state governments). 
45. ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating portions of the Lead 
Contamination Control Act). 
46. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“[N]o case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is 
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual 
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The inability to commandeer state governments to enact a federally 
desired program or regulatory scheme does not leave the federal government 
powerless to induce state action or cooperation.  To the contrary, the federal 
government retains ample authority to encourage state action through the 
provision of positive and negative incentives for state action.  Both carrots and 
sticks are permissible.  As the Court further explained in New York: 
 
[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under 
the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer 
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation . . . 
This arrangement . . . has been termed “a program of cooperative 
federalism.”47 
 
The most straightforward way to encourage state activity is to offer 
financial support for state programs that meet federal requirements or to 
otherwise confer benefits on compliant state governments.48  Such funding can 
be a powerful inducement to state cooperation, as it can serve to multiply state 
investments in a given field.  The federal government can also induce states to 
regulate in a desired field by threatening to preempt state policymaking in a 
given area.  In effect, the federal government can say to the states “Regulate X, 
or we’ll do it for you.”  Insofar as state policymakers wish to retain control 
over a given field, this may be sufficient incentive to act.  The federal 
government may also combine these incentives, simultaneously offering to 
fund compliant state programs and threatening to preempt noncompliant 
programs. 
The federal government has broad authority to incentivize state behavior, 
but such power is not unlimited.  Where the federal government seeks to 
encourage state action by offering financial support subject to certain 
conditions, there are constitutional constraints on what strings the federal 
government may attach.  In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court 
identified five potential restraints upon Congress’s use of conditional federal 
spending.  First, the appropriation of funds must be for the “general welfare” 
and not for a narrow special interest.49  This is not much of a practical 
constraint, however, as the Court explained that federal courts should “defer 
 
sovereignty.”).  There is language in Printz that suggests purely ministerial requirements might be 
exempt from the anti-commandeering rule, but the federal courts have not, as yet, found an 
attempted commandeering that was sufficiently immaterial to warrant an exception.  See Printz, 
521 U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the Court “appropriately refrains from 
deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements” represent unconstitutional 
commandeering of state governments).  This may be due, in part, to the fact that relatively few 
statutes commandeer state governments. 
47. New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citations omitted). 
48. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (noting permissibility of imposing 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds to achieve “broad policy objectives”). 
49. Id. at 207. 
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substantially to the judgment of Congress” in making this determination.50  
Under this deferential standard, programs such as Medicare and Medicaid are 
clearly constitutional. 
Second, “the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of 
the main purposes for which . . . funds are expended.”51  As reaffirmed in New 
York v. United States, the “conditions must . . . bear some relationship to the 
purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the spending power 
could render academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal 
authority.”52  Thus, the federal government can require health care providers to 
observe certain practices if they receive Medicare reimbursements or funding 
for medical research.  More questionable, however, would be the imposition of 
such requirements as a condition of receiving funding for highway 
construction or community policing. 
Third, there can be no independent constitutional bar to the condition 
imposed upon the federal spending.53  In other words, Congress may not place 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds that would require states to engage in 
conduct that would otherwise be unconstitutional. 
A fourth requirement is that any conditions imposed upon the receipt of 
federal funds must be clear and unambiguous.54  Specifically, recipients of 
federal funds must have notice of any conditions with which they must 
comply, and the scope of their obligation.55  As the Court noted in Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, “the legitimacy of Congress’s power to 
legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily 
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”56  As the Court recently 
explained, 
 
Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses 
federal money to the States, but when Congress attaches conditions 
to a State’s acceptance of federal funds, the conditions must be set 
out “unambiguously”. . . . “[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power is much in the nature of a contract,” and therefore, to 
be bound by “federally imposed conditions,” recipients of federal 
funds must accept them “voluntarily and knowingly.”57 
 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 208. 
52. New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citations omitted). 
53. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
54. Id. at 207. 
55. Id. at 207. 
56. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  The interpretive rule urged in Pennhurst is arguably in tension 
with Chevron deference for agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language.  See David 
E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 70–71 (1994) (discussing the Pennhurst 
decision). 
57. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). 
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States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are “unaware” 
or which they are “unable to ascertain.”58  Dole also suggested a possible fifth 
limitation on the use of conditional spending: “coercion.” After identifying the 
four requirements just outlined, the Court noted that “in some circumstances 
the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass 
the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”59  This point has been 
reiterated in subsequent cases, albeit without much elaboration.60  While not 
explaining what would be necessary to turn “pressure” into “compulsion,” the 
Dole majority made clear that conditioning a relatively small amount of money 
on compliance with modest regulatory requirements would not satisfy this 
test.61 
Federal appellate courts have not been particularly demanding of 
conditional federal spending.  Following the Dole majority, courts have not 
second-guessed legislative judgments that a given spending program advances 
the “general welfare” or that conditions are sufficiently connected to the 
purposes of the spending at issue.62  The requirement that Congress make any 
conditions imposed upon the receipt of federal spending explicit and 
unambiguous provides a more readily justifiable limitation on conditional 
spending. 
In Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, an en banc panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invalidated limitations the 
Department of Education imposed on the receipt of federal funds under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).63  The Fourth Circuit 
held that the Department of Education could not impose conditions on state 
receipt of IDEA funds that were not explicit in the statute itself, such as a 
requirement that state provide educational services to students expelled for 
misconduct unrelated to their disabilities.64  According to the court, “Language 
which, at best, only implicitly conditions the receipt of federal funding on the 
fulfillment of certain conditions is insufficient to impose on the state the 
condition sought.”65  Since, “at most [the IDEA] only implicitly conditions the 
States’ receipt of funds” upon the requirement enforced by the Department of 
Education, the condition could not be imposed on a non-consenting state.66  
 
58. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
59. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
60. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 687 (1999) (noting that, in some instances, “‘the financial inducement offered by Congress 
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion’” (quoting Dole, 
483 U.S. at 211)); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (noting limits of federal 
spending power). 
61. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
62. See, e.g., Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding the conditioning the 
receipt of federal funds for highway maintenance on the establishment of a national speed limit 
was not coercive). 
63. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir.) (en banc). 
64. Id. at 560. 
65. Id. at 561. 
66. Id. at 563 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
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The court explained further: 
 
Insistence upon a clear, unambiguous statutory expression of 
congressional intent to condition the States’ receipt of federal funds 
in a particular manner is especially important where, as here, the 
claimed condition requires the surrender of one of, if not the most 
significant of, the powers or functions reserved to the States by the 
Tenth Amendment.67 
 
Federal appellate courts have not found conditions placed upon the receipt 
of federal Medicaid funding to be coercive or otherwise problematic under 
South Dakota v. Dole.68  Nonetheless, the constitutional limitations on 
commandeering and coercive use of conditional federal spending could 
constrain certain aspects of the ACA, particularly if sufficient attention is not 
paid to sovereign state interests as the law is implemented.69  Some provisions 
of the ACA, at least when viewed in isolation, could present significant 
constitutional concerns.  The imposition of additional requirements on states 
by HHS or other federal agencies could create additional problems. 
Consider the ACA’s provisions concerning health benefit exchanges and 
the expansion of Medicaid.  Section 1311(b) provides that every state “shall . . 
. establish an American Health Benefit Exchange” by 2014.70  The ACA 
further requires that each state exchange must provide a marketplace for the 
purchase of health insurance plans,71 determine participant eligibility for 
federal subsidies and Medicaid,72 and administer the statutory exemptions to 
the individual mandate.73  In the future, HHS will detail additional 
requirements for state health benefit exchanges and the conditions states must 
meet to obtain waivers from the Act’s requirements.74 
Section 1311 in isolation would unquestionably violate the constitutional 
prohibition on commandeering.  Congress may not simply dictate to states or 
mandate that state governments implement a federal law or administrative 
scheme.  Section 1311 is not the only relevant provision, however.  Perhaps 
 
67. Id. at 566. 
68. See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding 
requirement that states provide emergency medical services to illegal aliens as condition on 
receipt of Medicaid funding); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); Oklahoma v. 
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  But see W. Va v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human 
Svcs., 289 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[F]ederal statutes that threaten the loss of an entire 
block of federal funds upon a relatively minor failing by a state are constitutionally suspect.”). 
69. JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN, VANDERBILT HEALTH POL’Y CTR., WHO'S IN CHARGE? MORE 
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, Dec. 6, 2010, 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Blumstein20101206.pdf. 
70. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(b), 124 Stat. 
119, 173–182 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18024) (emphasis added). 
71. § 1321, 123 Stat. at 18687. 
72. § 1413, 124 Stat. at 23335. 
73. Sec. 5000a, § 1501, 124 Stat. at 24449. 
74. See Moffit, supra note 4, at 4. 
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recognizing the potential commandeering problem, the ACA’s authors added 
Section 1321, which provides that a state must “elect” to establish an exchange 
in accordance with the Act or the federal government “shall . . . establish and 
operate” an exchange within that state.75  This provision seems to turn the 
exchange requirement from a simple (unconstitutional) mandate to a 
constitutional inducement.  States have the option of implementing an 
exchange or accepting an exchange created by the federal government.76 
Such conditional preemption schemes are presumptively constitutional.  
Yet much may depend on how the exchange provisions are implemented.  
HHS is still in the process of issuing regulations clarifying the precise 
requirements that health exchanges and participating insurers must meet.  Until 
these rules are finalized, it will be difficult for the federal government to argue 
that states voluntarily accepted any and all requirements that are subsequently 
imposed.  At present, it is uncertain whether states will agree to implement 
exchanges in accord with federal requirements.  Much may depend on the rate 
at which the federal government can clarify the requirements and provide 
greater certainty about the extent to which financial assistance will (or will not) 
be available.  More than twenty states declined to accept federal funds to create 
temporary state-based high-risk insurance pools.77 
The ACA contains another provision that may complicate any coercion 
analysis under the Dole test.  The ACA provides tax credits for the purchase of 
health insurance plans through state-based exchanges.78  The purpose of this 
provision is to subsidize the purchase of health insurance and help expand 
coverage.  Yet under Section 1401, these tax credits are only for insurance 
purchased “through an Exchange established by the State under Section 1311,” 
not for exchanges created under Section 1321.79  In other words, the tax credits 
for state citizens are only available if the state itself creates the exchange.  If 
the federal government creates the exchange, the state’s citizens lose their tax 
benefits.  Under most conditional spending statutes, states may risk losing 
direct financial support if they fail to follow federal dictates.  Here, however, it 
is state citizens who lose a financial benefit if their state does not act.  This 
structure could create potential coercion concerns insofar as the Dole test 
focuses on whether the relevant conditions “interfere[] with the state’s 
sovereign accountability.”80 
 
75. § 1321(b), (c), 124 Stat. at 186; see also Peter Suderman, Rogue States: The Revolt 
Against ObamaCare, REASON, (Oct. 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/14/rogue-states 
(noting much of the language in the ACA “was never intended to be final” and reads like “beta 
software” that was “still crawling with bugs” when enacted). 
76. § 1321(b), (c), 124 Stat. at 186. 
77. Kevin Sack, High-Risk Insurance Pools Are Attracting Few, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, 
at A19 (noting twenty-seven states opted to run high-risk pools, leaving the federal government to 
operate the pools in the remaining states directly). 
78. § 1401, 124 Stat. at 21319. 
79. Sec. 36B(b)(2)(A), § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213. 
80. Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the 
Dole Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L REV. 163, 173 (2001) (“Coercion implicates a state’s ability to act as 
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The ACA’s revisions to the federal Medicaid program may also press up 
against the constitutional limits on conditional spending as they are 
implemented in the years ahead.  The ACA dramatically changed the federal 
Medicaid program.  According to the Supreme Court, “Medicaid is a 
cooperative federal-state program . . . [and] participation in the program is 
voluntary.”81  As the Court explained in another case, “participation in the 
Medicaid program is entirely optional, [but] once a State elects to participate, it 
must comply with the requirements . . . .”82  Further, Congress expressly 
reserved the rights to “alter, amend, or repeal” Medicaid in its authorizing 
legislation.83  Yet these declarations do not necessarily establish that newly 
adopted Medicaid requirements (and those yet to be adopted by HHS) pass 
constitutional muster. 
Medicaid is an increasingly important share of state budgets and accounts 
for approximately twenty one percent of state spending.84  It has been called 
“the Pac-Man of state budgets.”85  The expanded coverage requirements 
imposed by the ACA, specifically the requirement that states cover those 
below 133% of the poverty line,86 will increase these costs and long-term 
federal financial support is not guaranteed.  The expanded eligibility 
requirements are expected to result in an additional sixteen to twenty two 
million Medicaid enrollees.87  Much of these costs will be covered by the 
federal government, but even a small increase in states’ financial obligations 
under Medicaid could be quite significant.88  Few states voluntary opted to 
extend Medicaid coverage this far prior to enactment of the ACA.89 
Although legally voluntary, most analysts believe Medicaid is, for all 
 
a representative of its people, not the state’s level of temptation in choosing among 
alternatives.”). 
81. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990). 
82. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). 
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (“The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this 
chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress.”). 
84. See Peter Suderman, ObamaCare and the Medicaid Mess, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703843004576138682854557922.html. 
85. Leighton Ku, Ready, Set, Plan, Implement: Executing the Expansion of Medicaid, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1173, 1175 (2010). 
86. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a), 124 Stat. 
119, 271 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)). 
87. Kenneth Jost, States and Federalism: The Issues, 20 CQ RESEARCHER 847, 852 (2010). 
88. Some analysts suggest that additional state financial obligations under the ACA will be 
offset by cost-savings generated by other portions of the law.  See Jost, supra note 87, at 852 
(arguing savings in other areas, including unreimbursed medical care for uninsured individuals, 
could “be more than enough to offset” new spending required by the law).   Estimates of the likely 
fiscal impact of the ACA on states vary dramatically.  See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
RL 7-5700, VARIATION IN ANALYSES OF PPACA’S FISCAL IMPACT ON STATES (2010) 
(discussing the impact of ACA on Medicaid). 
89. Edmund F. Haislmaier & Brian C. Blase, Obamacare: Impact on States, HERITAGE 
FOUND.,  BACKGROUNDER No. 2433 (July 1, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2010/07/obamacare-impact-on-states. 
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practical purposes, “obligatory.”90  Legal scholars have begun to question 
whether Medicaid can still be considered a fully voluntary program, and 
whether Congress retains the ability to redefine state obligations without, in 
effect, offering a new set of contractual terms.91  According to John Holahan of 
the Urban Institute’s Health Policy Research Center, “No state has ever 
seriously considered walking away” from Medicaid.92  One wonders if a state 
actually could.  Under the ACA, states that participate in Medicaid are subject 
to new requirements, including a “maintenance of effort” mandate that 
prevents states from restricting state program eligibility.93  If, as some suggest, 
Medicaid has a political “lock-in effect” that limits the ability of states to opt 
out of the program, then it may not make sense to continue to characterize state 
participation as “voluntary.”94 
As with the exchanges, some new Medicaid requirements will be fleshed 
out through administrative proceedings and rulemakings.  Other decisions, 
such as whether the federal government will continue to support higher doctor 
reimbursement rates after 2014, will have to be resolved by Congress.  The 
success or failure of health benefit exchanges could affect whether eligible 
individuals and families rely upon Medicaid or obtain private coverage through 
the exchanges.  There is a limit to how much exchanges can be expected to 
assume responsibility for those on Medicaid, however, because the tax credits 
for the purchase of health insurance plans in exchanges only apply to those in 
between 100 and 400 % of the federal poverty level.95  Those at or below the 
poverty line will receive no such tax credits, and are thus more likely to stay on 
Medicaid. 
It is too soon to know whether the ACA’s exchange or Medicaid 
provisions run into constitutional problems, and much will depend upon how 
these, and other, provisions are implemented.  It is far more difficult for states 
to mount facial challenges to requirements imposed on the receipt of federal 
funding than to challenge specific impositions and administrative enforcement 
decisions.96  Insofar as Dole limits administrative interpretations and 
implementation, more than the statute itself, it is too soon to challenge the 
ACA on such grounds.  Rather, it will be necessary to see how the law works 
in practice. 
 
90. Jost, supra note 87, at 853. 
91. See James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid 
Managed Care: Tennessee (Tenncare) as a Case Study and Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125, 
141–42 (2000) (discussing states’ ability to “departicipate” from Medicaid). 
92. Jost, supra note 87, at 852–53. 
93. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124 Stat. 119, 
275 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)). 
94. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 91, at 133, 141–42. 
95. Sec. 38B(c)(1)(B), § 1401, 124 Stat. at 215. 
96. See W. Va v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 289 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(noting the state has a “very heavy burden to carry” in facial challenge, particularly if federal 
officials have enforcement discretion). 
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IV.  FEDERAL INFLUENCES ON STATE POLICY CHOICES 
It is evident that the federal government may directly influence actions 
taken by state governments, such as by preempting state action or providing 
financial inducements for states to act.  Such direct interventions are only half 
of the picture, however.  Just as federal action may encourage or discourage 
state regulatory action directly, federal action may indirectly, or even 
incidentally, encourage or discourage state regulatory action. 
Federal policies can facilitate greater state regulation where such actions 
reduce the costs of state implementation, such as by subsidizing necessary 
research or reducing infrastructure costs.  Similarly, where federal policies 
increase the demand for given regulatory policies at the state level, the federal 
policies have the practical effect of altering or setting state policy agendas.  
The positive effects of federal action on state policy initiatives are less 
significant, and perhaps more obvious, than the potential negative effects. 
Federal policies will discourage state regulatory action where they 
“signal” that state regulatory action is excessive or unnecessary, or where they 
reduce the marginal benefits of adopting state regulatory programs—benefits 
either to the general welfare, those interest groups demanding state regulatory 
activity, or to the policymakers responsible for adopting the relevant policies.97  
Such “crowding out” is most likely to occur where federal regulations serve as 
a substitute for state regulations, though there may be other factors that have a 
similar effect.  Adding in these indirect influences—facilitation, agenda 
setting, signaling, and crowding out—produces a more complete matrix of 
ways that federal policies influence state regulatory choices, which is 
illustrated in Figure 1.98 
 
  
 
97. It should be noted that the hypotheses presented in this section are not dependent upon 
any particular theory about what sorts of interests ultimately drive the policymaking process.  The 
hypotheses are equally compatible with public interest and public choice theories of policy 
formation.  See Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
179, 214–23 (2005) (summarizing various theories of regulation); Daniel A. Farber, Politics and 
Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 62–70 (1992). 
98. This table is reproduced from Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of 
Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 89 (2007). 
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Figure 1 
Federal Influence on State Regulatory Activity 
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Without offering any direct inducements, the federal government may 
encourage state policymakers to adopt regulations that they would not 
otherwise enact by affecting the costs and benefits of state regulatory 
measures, or by increasing the demand for given policies at the state level.  By 
taking high-profile actions, the federal government may elevate the salience of 
particular issues to state policymakers, thereby increasing the demand for 
regulation or other policy action in a given state.99  In this fashion, federal 
policymakers may engage in “agenda setting” that influences state regulatory 
policy choices. 
Actions by all three branches can have an agenda setting effect.  For 
example, a study by an executive agency or congressional committee may 
identify a particular health concern and could prompt local action to reduce the 
threat.  A presidential address or legislative hearing may drive media coverage 
of a particular policy concern and increase calls for a particular solution.  
National debate over a given issue, such as whether to create or reform a new 
entitlement or whether to mandate certain types of insurance coverage, may 
prompt states to act where the federal government does not.  Similarly, a 
judicial decision either requiring the federal government to act, or perhaps 
finding that the federal government lacks the power to address a given concern, 
may raise the profile of a given issue and increase the demand for action at the 
state level. 
A second way that federal action may indirectly encourage greater state 
action is by reducing the costs of developing or implementing policy measures 
at the state level.  Federally funded scientific research, data collection, and 
information disclosure requirements may reduce the fixed costs of developing, 
implementing, and enforcing state-level programs.  Federal tax credits for the 
purchase of health insurance through state-run exchanges could increase 
participation rates and help hold down average costs. 
Federal programs could also have both sorts of positive effects 
 
99. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 55 (2003) (“[I]ncreased activity and publicity about an issue can over 
time change stakeholder perceptions and possibly preferences.”). 
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simultaneously.  A federal program that requires the production and disclosure 
of certain information may have an agenda-setting effect by illustrating and 
exposing a problem to local officials.  At the same time, the production and 
disclosure of relevant information may facilitate state agencies to implement 
their own policies to address the problem. 
The positive effects of federal action on state policy initiatives are less 
significant, and perhaps more obvious, than the potential negative effects.  As a 
consequence, the potential negative effects deserve greater consideration.  This 
is particularly so because it is generally presumed that federal intervention to 
establish a national “floor” has the primary effect of increasing the aggregate 
level of protection or government action in a given area.100  Yet if federal 
action can discourage state action in a given area, the net effect of such federal 
action is not necessarily positive. 
Federal action may discourage state regulatory action in at least two ways.  
First, the adoption of a federal regulatory standard may “signal” that more 
stringent state regulations are unnecessary.  In effect, the federal action may be 
seen as evidence that a given level of government intervention is sufficient to 
safeguard relevant public interests, and more stringent measures are 
unnecessary.  As a result, the adoption of a federal “floor” may induce state 
policymakers to lower comparable state protections.  In addition, the adoption 
of a federal regulation may “crowd out” state regulatory measures by reducing 
the net benefits provided by additional state measures.  As a result, the 
existence of federal regulation may discourage the adoption of additional state-
level regulatory protections in the future. 
Signaling occurs when federal intervention provides a “signal” that a 
given level of government action is the appropriate level, thereby discouraging 
states from adopting more stringent or protective policies.101  Specifically, the 
adoption of a given regulatory standard by a federal agency sends a “signal” 
that the relevant standard is worthwhile and that additional requirements may 
be unnecessary.  One reason for this effect is that federal policymakers, and 
expert federal agencies in particular, are presumed to have substantial technical 
expertise.  Prominent federal action may convince state policymakers, or their 
constituents, that additional safeguards are “unnecessary” or that the benefits 
of more stringent regulatory protections are not worth their costs.  The 
magnitude of this effect is likely to correspond with the magnitude of the 
difference between the relevant federal and state standards.  In this way, 
 
100. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 351, 375 (2000) (noting need for “strong federal regulatory floor”); Barry G. Rabe et al., 
State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6–7 
(2005) (noting “the notion of federal policy as a ‘floor’ protecting certain ‘fundamental rights’ 
still has vitality” in environmental policy debates). 
101. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 25 (1994) (noting “an action is informative if it is 
taken by an informed person who pays a fee, expends effort, or foregoes some valuable 
alternative activity in order to take the action.”).  On signaling generally, see JEFFREY S. BANKS, 
SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1991). 
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federal standards can discourage state policymakers from adopting and 
maintaining more stringent measures of their own, even where such measures 
could be justified.  As a practical matter, the federal “floor” may become a 
“ceiling” as well. 
There are several reasons why this “signaling” effect may be of concern.  
First, and perhaps most important, the existence of a signaling effect that 
reduces the level of state regulations below what they would otherwise be, 
could reduce the net benefits provided by federal regulations.  When the 
federal government adopts a federal standard, this will increase the level of 
protection in those states with standards that are below the federal “floor.”  At 
the same time, it risks lowering the level of protection in any state that 
responds to the federal signal. 
This effect is not merely hypothetical.  In the environmental context, state 
legislatures sometimes adopt measures to prevent state regulatory agencies 
from adopting regulatory standards that are more stringent than federal rules.102  
Between 1987–1995, nearly twenty states adopted at least one statute limiting 
the ability of state agencies to adopt regulatory controls more stringent than 
relevant federal standards.103 
A similar effect is possible in the health care context.  If the federal 
government adopts a particular minimum package of health care benefits for 
poorer Americans, this may send a signal to state policymakers that providing 
benefits beyond the federal level is unnecessary or imprudent.  Similarly, if the 
federal government imposes a set of minimum coverage that health insurers 
must offer, in the context of an exchange or otherwise, this may signal to state 
policymakers that there is no real need to mandate a different degree or mix of 
coverage.  Such responses by state policymakers could be entirely rational 
insofar as they may presume that federal policymakers have greater expertise 
in the given policy area.  Moreover, state policymakers could rationally 
conclude that deferring to federal policy judgments is a way to economize on 
information and policy development costs. 
The potential for federal intervention to “crowd out” preferable state 
policy initiatives in a given area is of at least equal concern.104  Crowding out 
may occur when federal action serves as a substitute for state-level action.  
Where this occurs, federal intervention can reduce the marginal benefits of 
adopting or maintaining similar policies at the state level.  Over time, this can 
discourage the adoption of optimal state-level policy responses.  If the federal 
government dominates health policy, entrepreneurial state policymakers may 
 
102. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental 
Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive 
Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1376–86 (1995); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federalism and 
the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 1465 
(1996) (stating there is a “movement among state legislatures to prohibit more stringent state 
standards.”). 
103. See Organ, supra note 102, at 1376 n.13. 
104. The “crowding out” theory is fleshed out in Adler, supra note 98, at 98–106. 
HEALTHFED                                                                  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2012  2:27 PM 
 ADLER: COOPERATION, COMMANDEERING, CROWDING OUT 237 
opt to focus their efforts where the playing field is clear. 
The effect of crowding out is not simply that states will intervene less if 
the federal government is involved.  The more troubling possibility is that 
federal intervention will discourage states from adopting better or more 
protective policies than that established by the federal “floor.”  Further, insofar 
as federal intervention may have this effect, it can discourage state-level policy 
innovation, as there will be less incentive for state policymakers to devote their 
efforts to developing new policy initiatives in areas dominated by the federal 
presence.  This is particularly true if a set of policy interventions is subject to 
diminishing marginal returns.  In such a case, the federal government is likely 
to displace the most cost-beneficial state efforts.  For instance, the creation of 
health insurance exchanges may discourage states from experimenting with 
alternative ways of meeting the same underlying policy goals.  Because of 
crowding out, there may be less government intervention and policy innovation 
than had the federal government not intervened at all.  The adoption of a 
federal “floor” may actually prevent further and future upward progress. 
Crowding out occurs, in part, because there are significant fixed costs to 
policy change.  Therefore, federal interventions that reduce the net positive 
benefits of state action on the margin may reduce the likelihood of state action 
at all because state policymakers are only likely to act where the benefits of 
policy change are greater than the total costs of such change.  The inevitable 
inertia that affects all policymaking processes combines with the federal 
involvement to discourage net beneficial state-level policy changes that would 
have otherwise been enacted.  An implication of crowding out is that federal 
intervention does not necessarily increase the net amount of government 
involvement in a given policy space over time.  Further, when the crowding 
out effect is combined with the signaling effect discussed above, the likelihood 
that federal intervention could cause a net decline in the aggregate level of 
regulatory protection increases.  At the very least, the possibility of signaling 
and crowding out threaten to reduce the net benefits of federal intervention in a 
given policy sphere. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ACA is not the last word on health care reform.  It is but the latest 
chapter in a decades-long debate over the proper federal role in the provision 
and regulation of health care services.  Substantial federal intervention in 
health care markets may be justified, but such intervention is never without its 
costs.  Among other things, federal action can discourage complementary state 
efforts or incite federal-state conflict.  Failure to consider the practical and 
constitutional limitations on federal power to intervene in health care can result 
in counterproductive policies and make it more difficult to achieve national 
health care goals.  The federal and state governments are capable of working 
together, but they can also work apart. 
